The Miracle of the Greek Revolution (1821-1832)

"... for the greatest miracle of all was surely the outcome of the war itself," writes Mark Mazower (professor of History at Columbia University in New York) on page 460 of his voluminous (573 pages) study of the Greek Revolution that began in 1821 and ended in July 1832 when the Ottoman Sultan Mahmut II officially recognised the Kingdom of Greece. It was the beginning of the Ottoman-Greek and after 1923 Turkish-Greek relationship, which cannot be called entirely unproblematic up to this day.

Five years earlier, things looked extremely bad for the Greek insurgents. The Ottoman commander-in-chief Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehmet Ali Pasha, ruler of Egypt and founder of the Egyptian royal family, had reconquered almost all of the mainland of Greece and was about to conquer the islands of Hydra and Spetses, bases of Greek naval power, consisting mainly of pirates and privateers, which would most likely have meant the end of the revolution.

Fate, however, wanted otherwise. On October 20, 1827, the combined Ottoman and Egyptian fleets were routed in Navarino Bay, present-day Pylos, by a Franco-Anglo-Russian fleet commanded by Admiral Codrington. The Russian squadron was commanded by the Dutchman Lodewijk, Count van Heiden, the only Dutch naval hero from Drenthe, who earned his spurs in Russian service. According to tradition, he would be Berend Botje from the well-known children's song, but this aside.

In his well-known, lively style of writing, Mazower presents us with an extremely detailed picture of the beginning and course of the Greek revolution, which began with the invasion of Walachia by Prince Alexander Ypsilantis on February 22, 1821. An invasion that soon failed because the Russian Tsar was unwilling to support the uprising.

In the following March a number of local uprisings broke out in the Morea (Peloponnese), which grew into the revolutionary struggle out of which the Kingdom of Greece would eventually arise, something that the insurgents had not initially envisaged, according to Mazower. For most of the rebellion's leaders, wealthy landowners, such as the Deliyannis family, or former brigands, such as Theodoros Kolokotronis and other warlords, the main concern was power and self-enrichment. Mazower thoroughly does away with the heroic status accorded to men like Kolokotronis, Petros Mavromihalis and Odysseus Androutsos, to name just a few, in later nationalistic Greek historiography. During the war, Greek warlords sometimes fought each other more often and more eagerly than the Ottomans. Shocking are the stories of Greek gangs, 'irregulars' Mazower calls them, who plunder Greek villages and towns, as shocking as the massacre or enslavement by the Greeks of a large part of the Muslim population in the Peloponnese. The massacre on Chios in April 1822, an event that had repercussions throughout the whole of Europe, shows that the Ottomans were just as worse. 

In addition to these horror stories, he also describes heroic deeds, such as the sinking of the Ottoman flagship off Chios by Admiral Kanaris and the tenacious defence of Messolonghi (1825/26), with the valiant, if partly unsuccessful, desperate attempt of the defenders, accompanied by women and children, to break through the lines of the besiegers. It shows the book as a well balanced study.

Mazower discusses the role of Greek intellectuals, often educated abroad, such as Adamantios Koraïs and Alexandros Mavrokordatos vis-a-vis that of followers of the Filiki Etairia, founded by Greeks in Odessa, who, according to the intellectuals, were going way too fast because the time for a revolt was not yet ripe in their eyes. Mavrokordatos understood that the battle could never be won without the support of the European Great Powers and that this required an representative Greek government, something to which the landowning elite and warlords basically were opposed. That something like such a government eventually emerged, although it was usually quite powerless, is a small miracle in itself.

The role of Philhellenism in Europe and America is extensively discussed as well as its influence on the course of the war. The death of Lord Byron in Messolonghi, not by a bullet, but by malaria, sent a shock wave through Europe. Mazower also writes about the connections of Philhellenism with the liberal pursuit of parliamentary democracy in Europe and abolitionism, the struggle for the abolition of slavery in the US and European colonies. It's not for nothing that the subtitle reads '1821 and the Making of Modern Europe'. This makes The Greek Revolution a particularly rich and important study, which in terms of depth and quality will not soon be surpassed in its kind, I believe. An absolute necessity for anyone with an interest in the history of Modern Greece and Europe.

Gioconda, de joden van Thessaloniki in de Griekse literatuur

Thessaloniki, de tweede stad van Griekenland en de zuidelijke toegangspoort tot de Balkan, heeft in zijn lange geschiedenis onderdak geboden aan tal van bevolkingsgroepen. In 315 v.Chr. gesticht door de zwager van Alexander de Grote, wordt zij vanaf de Oudheid tot op de dag van vandaag bewoond door Grieken, maar die vormden niet altijd de meerderheid. Nadat de stad in 1430 werd veroverd door de Ottomanen, vestigden zich ook Turken binnen haar muren, waar eveneens vanaf de Oudheid een kleine joodse gemeenschap woonde. In de Ottomaanse tijd voegden zich daar andere Balkanbewoners bij, maar vooral de immigratie van tienduizenden joden in de late vijftiende en vroege zestiende eeuw, die waren verdreven uit Portugal en Spanje, zou een stempel drukken op Thessaloniki. 

Tot hun deportatie door de Duitse bezetter in 1943, vormden de joden de grootste bevolkingsgroep van de stad en was het joods-Spaanse dialect waarvan zij zich bedienden, het ladino, de meest gehoorde taal. In 1912, na de Eerste Balkanoorlog, werd Thessaloniki deel van het Griekse koninkrijk. De enorme stadsbrand van 1917 en bevolkingsuitwisselingen met Bulgarije (1919) en Turkije (1923) als nasleep van de Eerste Wereldoorlog, veranderden het karakter van de stad, die grotendeels moest worden herbouwd en waarin het Griekse element sterk toenam. Het wegvoeren van de bijna 48.000 joden door de Duitsers, waarvan er slechts 2500 na de oorlog terugkeerden, betekende het einde van Thessaloniki als multiculturele stad. Zij werd weer wat zij in eerste aanleg was: een Griekse stad. 

De herinnering aan de joden was daarmee echter niet uitgewist en zeker niet die aan hun gruwelijk lot in de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Hoewel een opmerking als ‘Thessaloniki was een jodenstad,’ een schrijver als G.Th.Vafópoulos in het weinig democratische en door rechtsautoritaire krachten beheerste Griekenland van de jaren ’50 nog flinke moeilijkheden kon bezorgen, zien we vooral met het volwassen worden van de Griekse democratie, na de val van de junta in 1974, de literaire belangstelling voor de joden toenemen.

Hero Hokwerda heeft in Gioconda vrijwel alles wat er in de Nieuwgriekse literatuur over de joden van Thessaloniki is geschreven in een kloeke bloemlezing bijeengebracht. Een bloemlezing die, om het overzichtelijk te houden, chronologisch is geordend in die zin dat de bijdragen niet zijn gerangschikt op jaar van publicatie, maar op de periode waarover de tekst voornamelijk gaat. Dat heeft voor- en nadelen. Het voordeel is dat er een duidelijk overzicht wordt geboden van wat er over een bepaalde periode is geschreven, het nadeel is dat het werk van sommige schrijvers, zoals dat van Vafópoulos, op hinderlijke wijze is verknipt. Hokwerda geeft de voorkeur aan deze structuur, wat geheel in lijn is met de wetenschappelijk aandoende opzet van de bloemlezing. Hij maakt daarop één uitzondering: de novelle Gioconda van Nikos Kokantzis, waaraan de titel van de bloemlezing is ontleend, is aan het begin van het boek geplaatst. Het beklemmende en ontroerende relaas van een puberliefde, die onder druk van de oorlogsomstandigheden opbloeit en rijpt, is terecht gekozen als opening van het boek, temeer omdat het lot van de joden tijdens de Duitse bezetting het leeuwendeel uitmaakt van de bijdragen.

Het interessante aan een boek in deze opzet is dat vrijwel alles wat over het onderwerp is geschreven bijeenstaat, maar daardoor is niet te voorkomen dat, naast vele prachtige bijdragen van hoog niveau, ook minder goede stukken moeten worden opgenomen. Er is allereerst veel moois in de bundel te vinden. Behalve de openingsnovelle verdienen hier zeker de bijdragen van Vafópoulos, de prachtige verhalen van Ioannou, enkele uitzonderlijk indrukwekkende vertellingen van Albertos Nar, het indringende proza van Nina Kokkalidou-Nahmia en het buitengewoon ontroerende verhaal Rachíl, van Kostoula Mitropoúlou te worden genoemd. De bloemlezing bevat ook prachtige poëzie, zoals het gedicht Esthír, of de zware bevalling van Pródromos Márkoglou. 

Naast de bovengenoemde juwelen zijn er nog vele andere parels in het boek te vinden, maar daar tegenover staat toch ook wel eens een stuk dat uit de toon valt, zoals Het achtste zegel van de openbaring van Giorgos Kaftantzís. Dat is een belabberd verhaal, dat lijdt onder de neiging van de auteur tot surrealistisch aandoende mooischrijverij. Als dichter levert dezelfde Kaftantzís met Rosa Miralaï echter een bijdrage die heel wat meer de moeite waard is. De spiegel en de maan van Kitsopoulos heeft voor mij iets te veel van een moraliserende Kerst(in dit geval misschien beter Paas)vertelling.

In het nawoord motiveert de samensteller zijn bedoelingen en geeft hij in een kleine zes bladzijden een overzicht van de 2320-jarige historie van Thessaloniki. Hoewel noodgedwongen erg summier, biedt dit voor wie geen enkele weet heeft van de geschiedenis van de stad, een nuttig raamwerk om de literatuur te kunnen plaatsen. Het is daarom nogal onlogisch en onhandig dat dit overzicht niet in een inleiding aan het begin van het boek staat, maar in het nawoord.

Met Gioconda heeft Hero Hokwerda een indrukwekkend monument opgericht voor de joden van Thessaloniki. Hiermee heeft hij de Nieuwgriekse literatuur, althans in Nederlandse vertaling, een belangrijke dienst bewezen. Het is in alle opzichten een unieke bloemlezing geworden, die zijn evenknie noch in het Nieuwgrieks, noch in het Engels en Hebreeuws heeft, wat bepaald opmerkelijk is te noemen.

Gioconda, de joden van Thessaloniki in de Griekse literatuur. Samenstelling, vertaling en nawoord: Hero Hokwerda. Uitgave Ta Grammata, Groningen 2004.

HISTORY AND THE CONFLICT OVER THE NAME 'MACEDONIA' (1990-1995)

HISTORY AND THE CONFLICT OVER THE NAME 'MACEDONIA' (1990-1995). Constructing and using historical interpretation.

When the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared its independence in 1991 it came into conflict with Greece about its name. Historical interpretation played an important role during this conflict. First of all I would like to discuss the Greek interpretation of history as such and its origin, secondly I would like to examine how Europe or rather the countries of the European Union reacted to the use of this interpretation as an argument to support the Greek position during the conflict.

At the turn of the 18th century the ideas of the European Enlightenment gradually began to penetrate the Ottoman Empire, causing some Greek intellectuals to start realizing that the Greeks were heirs to a great past. This conception became one of the stimuli for the Greek revolt of 1821. Early Greek nationalists based themselves almost completely on the classical past. If we may believe Richard Clogg, they still, to some extent, looked down upon Byzantium (Clogg, p. 2). This changed halfway through the 19th century under the influence of Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, a Constantinople born Greek who as a child moved to the Greek kingdom and whose writings still have a profound impact on Greek historiography. Partly to counter the scepticism of some European historians, amongst whom the Austrian J.P. Fallmerayer, about the 'greekness' of the modern Greeks and partly to provide the young kingdom with a means of national identification, he constructed his so-called Continuity Thesis. According to Paparrigopoulos there exists an unbroken connection between the ancient and modern Greeks by way of the Macedonian kingdom, the Byzantine Empire and the Greek-orthodox church which carried the flame of Hellenism during the days of the turcocratia. This meant that the small Greek state of the middle 19th century became heir to a great past and as such it had a duty - at least in nationalistic eyes - to strive for the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire; or at least to create a state including all the areas where Greeks were dwelling. This was the basis of the Megali Idea, one of the most powerful irredentist movements of the 19th and early 20th century which would finally lead to the Great Catastrophe of 1922 and the ethnic cleansings of 1923. Some of its echoes are still distinguishable in the Cyprus problem.

According to the Continuity Thesis, which is still the basis of the mainstream of Greek historiography, the ancient Macedonians are necessarily Greek and Alexander the Great is a powerful symbol of what Greek genius and perseverance could bring about. When the conflict about the name 'Macedonia' erupted in 1991 this interpretation of history played a central role in the Greek struggle against the use of this name by a Slavic people that arrived in the area centuries after Alexander the Great and was therefore not entitled to assume Greek names and symbols.

So, to the Greeks, the fact that the ancient Macedonians are Greek is essential for their identity, which has been questioned ever since the founding of the modern Greek state. Fallmerayer, whom I mentioned earlier, bluntly denied that the modern Greeks had anything whatsoever to do with the ancients. In the 19th century statements like these annoyed nationalists enormously, particularly since there was not much unity in the early Greek state, which at times looked merely like a collection of competing families and bands of brigands continuously at war with each other. It survived its early years solely because of English, French and Russian intervention and it was in great need of unifying elements of which a historical model of identification could be an important one.

In order to retrieve the origins of the conflict between Greece and FYROM and the Macedonian Question in general I refer to the avalanche of publications on the subject, particularly after the collapse of Yugoslavia. It is a fact however that most Greeks still feel a lot of irritation when FYROM is labelled 'Macedonia' although the belief has been growing gradually that Athens has lost the struggle, particularly as most foreign media are consistently using the name 'Macedonia' to indicate the FYROM. Calling 'Skopia' Macedonia was regarded as an act of stealing part of Greece's heritage by a non-Greek people (which made things worse by also using Greek symbols, e.g. on the national flag). And as such it was also seen as a strike against Greek national identity. Many Greeks also remembered the 1940s when Macedonia was founded as one of the six Yugoslav republics, at a time when Yugoslavia indeed claimed Greek Macedonia and for a while supported the Greek left during the bloody civil war (1946-1949). Although the government in Skopia denied any claims to Greek territory, it did very little to restrain the fanatical nationalistic propaganda which cried out loud about the fate of 'our suppressed Slavic brothers in the occupied parts' of Macedonia.

Alexander the Great became the symbol of protest in Greece. He grew into a kind of super-Greek. Thessaloniki airport was renamed Macedonia airport and everywhere in the country stickers and posters appeared forcing upon unsuspecting tourists the message that ‘Macedonia is Greek, was Greek, always will be Greek’ and urging them to study history. Had the people spreading these materials done so seriously themselves, they might have come to some surprising conclusions.

Did all this really impress Europe? In answering this question I will limit myself to looking at the European Union. I do so for practical reasons, but also because Skopia was first of all looking to Brussels for official recognition, while Greece wanted to force it to change its name by preventing this recognition. First of all I would like to examine the attitude of the press. However, in this field very little systematic research has been done. I will base my observation therefore mainly on the Kyriakos Kentrotis’ article on the German press. Personally, I prefer to talk about the ‘New Macedonian Question,’ to distinguish this period from the earlier conflicts involving Macedonia. As press reactions in Great-Britain and the Netherlands do not seem to have been so much different from those in Germany, as far as I have been able to follow the press, I would like to regard the German press for the time being as quite representative of the ideas of the Western European media.

In short, there was little appreciation of the Greek historical argument. Particularly the insistence on the ancient Macedonians being Greek strongly contributed to the idea that the Greek stand was fanatical, hysterical and nationalistic. Besides, this historical argument was seen as an absolutely irrelevant and backward way of conducting foreign policy (Kentrotis, p. 321-324). Kentrotis presents several explanations for this reaction, the most relevant of which I would like to discuss. First of all, according to Kentrotis, it is not only the argument itself which caused anger, but particularly the way in which it was presented. I quote: ‘They might have lent a more sympathetic ear to Greece’s apprehensions and taken them more seriously...had they not been peremptorily commanded by signs and leaflets at airports and stations to study Greek history...they were forced deliberately to compare that glorious past with both the excessive consumerism, huge foreign debt, stagnant economy, and ecological destruction of the Greece of today...(Kentrotis, p. 325-326).’

He argues that because of the highly popular idea of multi-culturalism in Western Europe there is a tendency to see Ancient Greece not only as the foundation of European culture, but just as one of the many building blocks of a much wider culture. This implies that the Greek cultural heritage belongs just as much to us as to the modern Greeks. Therefore there cannot be such a thing as the stealing of a Greek heritage exclusively belonging to that people.

Kentrotis also points to the decline of the study of the Classics in Western Europe as a result of which many people simply do not know what they are talking about. I have a strong suspicion that this may also be the case with part of the Dutch press. The Greek historical argument is in many cases not being taken seriously because of a profound lack of knowledge of, or worse, lack of interest in history. It may be useful to mention an article written in 1992 by the Dutch historian Van Loon, who argues that history has always been much more prominent in the minds of Balkan politicians than in that of their Western colleagues. I believe the Western press seems to suffer from the same impediment. According to Kentrotis the attitude of the journalist representing the Western press is basically pragmatic: ‘The German journalist observes, notes, and is astonished by the Greek’s inordinate attachment to history. Regarding it as an utterly outmoded approach to forging a foreign policy, she/he inevitably questions just how ‘European’ Greek political thinking and practice are (Kentrotis p. 322).’

How did Greece’s European partners look at the historical argument? Before answering this question I would like to make a few remarks concerning Greece’s position in Europe at the end of the Cold War. For several reasons this position had been weakened seriously: 

As Russia ceased to be a threat to the West, Greece’s strategic importance declined considerably. The economy had sunk into a deplorable state, despite large financial contributions by the EU, while one of the strongest reasons for keeping Greece within Europe had become less urgent because of the development of a stable democracy in the country (Economides p. 120). Due to this, and not least because of the anti-European rhetoric of prime minister Andreas Papandreou, Europe had come to regard Greece more and more as the troublesome outsider within the Union. The country, however, was basically well equiped to play a stabilizing role in the Balkans, but the chance to play a positive role on the peninsula was undermined by two problems: the economic chaos, despite financial support from the EU and the conflict with the FYROM about the name ‘Macedonia.’

On the basis of the writings of Kentrotis and Economides, as well as Yannis Prodromos’ article on Greece’s Policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans (Prodromos p. 153-168), we can state that the use of the historical argument by Greece did not result in unified support by its European allies. On the contrary. As the archives will be closed for many more years to come, it is quite impossible to look into the hearts of the decision makers to see how deeply they were touched by Greece’s historical argument, but it is not hard to establish that the initial support Athens received from the EU, given at the conference of EU leaders in Lisbon in June 1992, soon withered away and that some countries, amongst which Italy and the Netherlands, became highly irritated by the Greek stand. There are several causes for this, such as Skopia adopting the role of the underdog which played upon the feeling of solidarity for a poor little country being bullied by a larger neighbour on the one hand, and the existence of earlier irritations about the way Greece operated within the Union on the other. It is not likely that the Greek historical argument has done anything to change its partners’ minds. More likely most European politicians will have had the same feelings as were expressed in the press. If there was any sympathy for the Greek argument, it probably soon disappeared because of the way in which it was presented. In the words of Economides: ‘...they (the Greek arguments, KK) were badly presented and argued by Greek governments which concentrated on the symbols of populism and nationalism rather than on the real threats to Greece’s future security...’ (Economides p.123).

In general the Greek fear of FYROM was regarded by the Europeans, who inevitably looked at the matter from a different perspective than the Greeks, as somewhat ridiculous. The Greek historical argument, which was the essence of the Greek reasoning against the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ by FYROM, apparently did not carry much weight with them. Moreover, the European governments were, in Walldèn’s words, irritated rather than convinced by what they saw as irrational and irresponsible Greek behaviour.

My conclusion, a provisional one indeed, as there is still much to be researched, is that the interpretation of history, which is based on Paparrigopoulos’ Continuity Thesis, has, in the way it has been used by the Greek government and media, not made any contribution to support Greece’s position in the conflict with FYROM as far as the European press and its EU partners are concerned. On the contrary, the emphasis on history has weakened Greece’s position and contributed to the albeit unrealistic impression that in this conflict Greek behaviour was, as Kentrotis saw from the German press, fanatical, hysterical and nationalistic. 

Literature:

1. Clogg, Richard, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge 1992, p. 2.
2. Kentrotis, Kyriakos, The Macedonian Question as Presented in the German Press (1990-1994). In: Balkan Studies, vol. 36 nr. 2, Thessaloniki 1995.
3. (Loon van, W., Het Griekse gelijk. Griekenland en de kwestie Macedonië. In: Lychnari 6/4, Amsterdam 1992).
4. Economides, S., Greece and the New Europe in the 1990s. In: Philip Carabott, Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship, London 1995.
5. Prodromos, Yannis, Greece’s Policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans. In: C.P. Danopoulos & K.G. Messas, Crises in the Balkans. Views from the Participants, Boulder/Oxford 1997, p. 153-168.
6. Walldèn, Axel-Sotiris, Greece and the Macedonian State. In: Transitions vol. 36 nr. 1,2, 1995.

In: Hero Hokwerda (ed.) - Construction of Greek Past. Identity and Historical Consciousness from Antiquity to the Present. Groningen 2003.

Photo: Kees Klok