HISTORY AND THE CONFLICT OVER THE NAME 'MACEDONIA' (1990-1995)

HISTORY AND THE CONFLICT OVER THE NAME 'MACEDONIA' (1990-1995). Constructing and using historical interpretation.

When the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared its independence in 1991 it came into conflict with Greece about its name. Historical interpretation played an important role during this conflict. First of all I would like to discuss the Greek interpretation of history as such and its origin, secondly I would like to examine how Europe or rather the countries of the European Union reacted to the use of this interpretation as an argument to support the Greek position during the conflict.

At the turn of the 18th century the ideas of the European Enlightenment gradually began to penetrate the Ottoman Empire, causing some Greek intellectuals to start realizing that the Greeks were heirs to a great past. This conception became one of the stimuli for the Greek revolt of 1821. Early Greek nationalists based themselves almost completely on the classical past. If we may believe Richard Clogg, they still, to some extent, looked down upon Byzantium (Clogg, p. 2). This changed halfway through the 19th century under the influence of Constantinos Paparrigopoulos, a Constantinople born Greek who as a child moved to the Greek kingdom and whose writings still have a profound impact on Greek historiography. Partly to counter the scepticism of some European historians, amongst whom the Austrian J.P. Fallmerayer, about the 'greekness' of the modern Greeks and partly to provide the young kingdom with a means of national identification, he constructed his so-called Continuity Thesis. According to Paparrigopoulos there exists an unbroken connection between the ancient and modern Greeks by way of the Macedonian kingdom, the Byzantine Empire and the Greek-orthodox church which carried the flame of Hellenism during the days of the turcocratia. This meant that the small Greek state of the middle 19th century became heir to a great past and as such it had a duty - at least in nationalistic eyes - to strive for the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire; or at least to create a state including all the areas where Greeks were dwelling. This was the basis of the Megali Idea, one of the most powerful irredentist movements of the 19th and early 20th century which would finally lead to the Great Catastrophe of 1922 and the ethnic cleansings of 1923. Some of its echoes are still distinguishable in the Cyprus problem.

According to the Continuity Thesis, which is still the basis of the mainstream of Greek historiography, the ancient Macedonians are necessarily Greek and Alexander the Great is a powerful symbol of what Greek genius and perseverance could bring about. When the conflict about the name 'Macedonia' erupted in 1991 this interpretation of history played a central role in the Greek struggle against the use of this name by a Slavic people that arrived in the area centuries after Alexander the Great and was therefore not entitled to assume Greek names and symbols.

So, to the Greeks, the fact that the ancient Macedonians are Greek is essential for their identity, which has been questioned ever since the founding of the modern Greek state. Fallmerayer, whom I mentioned earlier, bluntly denied that the modern Greeks had anything whatsoever to do with the ancients. In the 19th century statements like these annoyed nationalists enormously, particularly since there was not much unity in the early Greek state, which at times looked merely like a collection of competing families and bands of brigands continuously at war with each other. It survived its early years solely because of English, French and Russian intervention and it was in great need of unifying elements of which a historical model of identification could be an important one.

In order to retrieve the origins of the conflict between Greece and FYROM and the Macedonian Question in general I refer to the avalanche of publications on the subject, particularly after the collapse of Yugoslavia. It is a fact however that most Greeks still feel a lot of irritation when FYROM is labelled 'Macedonia' although the belief has been growing gradually that Athens has lost the struggle, particularly as most foreign media are consistently using the name 'Macedonia' to indicate the FYROM. Calling 'Skopia' Macedonia was regarded as an act of stealing part of Greece's heritage by a non-Greek people (which made things worse by also using Greek symbols, e.g. on the national flag). And as such it was also seen as a strike against Greek national identity. Many Greeks also remembered the 1940s when Macedonia was founded as one of the six Yugoslav republics, at a time when Yugoslavia indeed claimed Greek Macedonia and for a while supported the Greek left during the bloody civil war (1946-1949). Although the government in Skopia denied any claims to Greek territory, it did very little to restrain the fanatical nationalistic propaganda which cried out loud about the fate of 'our suppressed Slavic brothers in the occupied parts' of Macedonia.

Alexander the Great became the symbol of protest in Greece. He grew into a kind of super-Greek. Thessaloniki airport was renamed Macedonia airport and everywhere in the country stickers and posters appeared forcing upon unsuspecting tourists the message that ‘Macedonia is Greek, was Greek, always will be Greek’ and urging them to study history. Had the people spreading these materials done so seriously themselves, they might have come to some surprising conclusions.

Did all this really impress Europe? In answering this question I will limit myself to looking at the European Union. I do so for practical reasons, but also because Skopia was first of all looking to Brussels for official recognition, while Greece wanted to force it to change its name by preventing this recognition. First of all I would like to examine the attitude of the press. However, in this field very little systematic research has been done. I will base my observation therefore mainly on the Kyriakos Kentrotis’ article on the German press. Personally, I prefer to talk about the ‘New Macedonian Question,’ to distinguish this period from the earlier conflicts involving Macedonia. As press reactions in Great-Britain and the Netherlands do not seem to have been so much different from those in Germany, as far as I have been able to follow the press, I would like to regard the German press for the time being as quite representative of the ideas of the Western European media.

In short, there was little appreciation of the Greek historical argument. Particularly the insistence on the ancient Macedonians being Greek strongly contributed to the idea that the Greek stand was fanatical, hysterical and nationalistic. Besides, this historical argument was seen as an absolutely irrelevant and backward way of conducting foreign policy (Kentrotis, p. 321-324). Kentrotis presents several explanations for this reaction, the most relevant of which I would like to discuss. First of all, according to Kentrotis, it is not only the argument itself which caused anger, but particularly the way in which it was presented. I quote: ‘They might have lent a more sympathetic ear to Greece’s apprehensions and taken them more seriously...had they not been peremptorily commanded by signs and leaflets at airports and stations to study Greek history...they were forced deliberately to compare that glorious past with both the excessive consumerism, huge foreign debt, stagnant economy, and ecological destruction of the Greece of today...(Kentrotis, p. 325-326).’

He argues that because of the highly popular idea of multi-culturalism in Western Europe there is a tendency to see Ancient Greece not only as the foundation of European culture, but just as one of the many building blocks of a much wider culture. This implies that the Greek cultural heritage belongs just as much to us as to the modern Greeks. Therefore there cannot be such a thing as the stealing of a Greek heritage exclusively belonging to that people.

Kentrotis also points to the decline of the study of the Classics in Western Europe as a result of which many people simply do not know what they are talking about. I have a strong suspicion that this may also be the case with part of the Dutch press. The Greek historical argument is in many cases not being taken seriously because of a profound lack of knowledge of, or worse, lack of interest in history. It may be useful to mention an article written in 1992 by the Dutch historian Van Loon, who argues that history has always been much more prominent in the minds of Balkan politicians than in that of their Western colleagues. I believe the Western press seems to suffer from the same impediment. According to Kentrotis the attitude of the journalist representing the Western press is basically pragmatic: ‘The German journalist observes, notes, and is astonished by the Greek’s inordinate attachment to history. Regarding it as an utterly outmoded approach to forging a foreign policy, she/he inevitably questions just how ‘European’ Greek political thinking and practice are (Kentrotis p. 322).’

How did Greece’s European partners look at the historical argument? Before answering this question I would like to make a few remarks concerning Greece’s position in Europe at the end of the Cold War. For several reasons this position had been weakened seriously: 

As Russia ceased to be a threat to the West, Greece’s strategic importance declined considerably. The economy had sunk into a deplorable state, despite large financial contributions by the EU, while one of the strongest reasons for keeping Greece within Europe had become less urgent because of the development of a stable democracy in the country (Economides p. 120). Due to this, and not least because of the anti-European rhetoric of prime minister Andreas Papandreou, Europe had come to regard Greece more and more as the troublesome outsider within the Union. The country, however, was basically well equiped to play a stabilizing role in the Balkans, but the chance to play a positive role on the peninsula was undermined by two problems: the economic chaos, despite financial support from the EU and the conflict with the FYROM about the name ‘Macedonia.’

On the basis of the writings of Kentrotis and Economides, as well as Yannis Prodromos’ article on Greece’s Policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans (Prodromos p. 153-168), we can state that the use of the historical argument by Greece did not result in unified support by its European allies. On the contrary. As the archives will be closed for many more years to come, it is quite impossible to look into the hearts of the decision makers to see how deeply they were touched by Greece’s historical argument, but it is not hard to establish that the initial support Athens received from the EU, given at the conference of EU leaders in Lisbon in June 1992, soon withered away and that some countries, amongst which Italy and the Netherlands, became highly irritated by the Greek stand. There are several causes for this, such as Skopia adopting the role of the underdog which played upon the feeling of solidarity for a poor little country being bullied by a larger neighbour on the one hand, and the existence of earlier irritations about the way Greece operated within the Union on the other. It is not likely that the Greek historical argument has done anything to change its partners’ minds. More likely most European politicians will have had the same feelings as were expressed in the press. If there was any sympathy for the Greek argument, it probably soon disappeared because of the way in which it was presented. In the words of Economides: ‘...they (the Greek arguments, KK) were badly presented and argued by Greek governments which concentrated on the symbols of populism and nationalism rather than on the real threats to Greece’s future security...’ (Economides p.123).

In general the Greek fear of FYROM was regarded by the Europeans, who inevitably looked at the matter from a different perspective than the Greeks, as somewhat ridiculous. The Greek historical argument, which was the essence of the Greek reasoning against the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ by FYROM, apparently did not carry much weight with them. Moreover, the European governments were, in Walldèn’s words, irritated rather than convinced by what they saw as irrational and irresponsible Greek behaviour.

My conclusion, a provisional one indeed, as there is still much to be researched, is that the interpretation of history, which is based on Paparrigopoulos’ Continuity Thesis, has, in the way it has been used by the Greek government and media, not made any contribution to support Greece’s position in the conflict with FYROM as far as the European press and its EU partners are concerned. On the contrary, the emphasis on history has weakened Greece’s position and contributed to the albeit unrealistic impression that in this conflict Greek behaviour was, as Kentrotis saw from the German press, fanatical, hysterical and nationalistic. 

Literature:

1. Clogg, Richard, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge 1992, p. 2.
2. Kentrotis, Kyriakos, The Macedonian Question as Presented in the German Press (1990-1994). In: Balkan Studies, vol. 36 nr. 2, Thessaloniki 1995.
3. (Loon van, W., Het Griekse gelijk. Griekenland en de kwestie Macedonië. In: Lychnari 6/4, Amsterdam 1992).
4. Economides, S., Greece and the New Europe in the 1990s. In: Philip Carabott, Greece and Europe in the Modern Period: Aspects of a Troubled Relationship, London 1995.
5. Prodromos, Yannis, Greece’s Policies in the Post-Cold War Balkans. In: C.P. Danopoulos & K.G. Messas, Crises in the Balkans. Views from the Participants, Boulder/Oxford 1997, p. 153-168.
6. Walldèn, Axel-Sotiris, Greece and the Macedonian State. In: Transitions vol. 36 nr. 1,2, 1995.

In: Hero Hokwerda (ed.) - Construction of Greek Past. Identity and Historical Consciousness from Antiquity to the Present. Groningen 2003.

Photo: Kees Klok